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TAX COURT ENDS THE ‘CASCADING ROYALTY’ PROBLEM 
The Service’s assault on back-to-back royalties was dealt a serious blow by a recent Tax Court decision which suggests that 
royalties paid by one foreign person to another cannot ever be U.S.-source income even if the rights are licensed for use in 
the U.S. The court expressed concern with cascading royalties, in which multiple taxation might be imposed on the same 
royalty as it makes its way up a chain of sublicensees, and held that there was no indication that Congress intended that 
result. 
  
In SDI Netherlands B. V., 107 TC No. 10, the Tax Court recently rejected the Service’s longstanding position that 
U.S.-source royalties received by foreign persons not engaged in a trade or business in the U.S. are subject to a second 
withholding tax when paid to another foreign person. Despite years of effort by the IRS to counter the use of back-to-back 
“royalty”-type arrangements to avoid the 30% withholding tax imposed by Sections 871(a) and 881(a) on such foreign 
persons, the court held that a foreign corporation not engaged in a U.S. trade or business is not liable for withholding taxes on 
royalties it derived partly from sources within the U.S. that it substantially onpaid to another foreign corporation. In reaching 
its holding, the Tax Court specifically rejected Rev. Rul. 80-362, 1980-2 CB 208, which reflects the Service’s position that 
royalties from the use of a patent in the U.S. remain U.S.-source income under Section 861(a)(4) and subject to withholding 
under Section 1441, regardless of the residence or identity of the payor. 
  
Facts 
SDI Ltd., a corporation organized under the laws of Bermuda, was the parent of the SDI Group of companies. The 
taxpayer--SDI Netherlands B.V.--was a Dutch corporation that was a wholly owned second-tier subsidiary of SDI Ltd. and a 
member of the SDI Group. The SDI Group also included SDI Bermuda Ltd., a corporation organized under the laws of 
Bermuda that also was a wholly owned subsidiary of SDI Ltd. (i.e., a sister corporation to SDI Netherlands). SDI USA, Inc., 
a corporation organized under the laws of California, was a wholly owned subsidiary of the taxpayer. 
  
SDI Bermuda granted the taxpayer worldwide rights to certain commercial software systems for IBM mainframe computers. 
This agreement (the “Bermuda license agreement”) gave the taxpayer a nonexclusive license to use (or market the use of), on 
a worldwide basis, all of the software and any and all industrial and intellectual property rights SDI Ltd. had or would acquire 
from the effective date of the agreement, in exchange for certain royalty payments. The Bermuda license agreement 
contained no express reference to the U.S. 
  
During the years in issue (1987-90), the taxpayer was a party to an exclusive agreement with SDI USA that provided for the 
licensing and use of the software in the U.S. (“the U.S. license agreement”), under which SDI USA was responsible for direct 
marketing and sales. The U.S. licensing agreement, required SDI USA to pay the taxpayer an annual royalty of 50% of its 
annual gross revenues from leasing and sublicensing of the software. The only deductions permitted by the U.S. license 
agreement were for rebates, discounts, and sales or value-added taxes. 
  
SDI USA made the royalty payments to the taxpayer that were called for under the agreement. No tax was withheld under 
Section 1441 by SDI USA on these payments since royalties paid by SDI USA to the taxpayer were exempt by virtue of 





Section 894 and Article IX of the 1948 version of the U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Convention, *109 as amended. During 
these four years, the taxpayer received close to $20 million in sublicense royalties, of which nearly $11 million were received 
under the sublicense with SDI USA. In turn, the taxpayer paid nearly $19 million in royalties to SDI Bermuda. The formula 
for computing the royalties owed by the taxpayer was based on a fraction of its receipts under the sublicenses, and therefore 
the royalties it owed to SDI Bermuda were not identical to what it received from SDI USA. 
  
Decision of the Tax Court 
The issue facing the court was whether the royalties paid by SDI Netherlands to SDI Bermuda were income received from 
sources within the U.S. by SDI Bermuda. Had the Tax Court decided for the Service, the taxpayer would have been required 
to withhold 30% U.S. tax on the U.S.-source portion of the royalties under Sections 1441 and 1442, corresponding to a 30% 
U.S. tax liability of SDI Bermuda under Section 881. Because the taxpayer was protected by the 1948 U.S.-Netherlands 
treaty from U.S. tax on its own royalty income under the sublicense to SDI USA, such a 30% withholding tax on the 
taxpayer’s royalty expense would have been the only U.S. tax owed by the taxpayer and SDI Bermuda. In light of the court’s 
apparent negative answer to the source question, however, no U.S. tax was owed by SDI Netherlands or SDI Bermuda. 
  
The direct path to the result. 
As stated by the court, the Service viewed the case as a simple matter of tracing a portion of the foreign-to-foreign royalty 
back to the U.S.-to-foreign royalty (which was easy to do in light of the relationship between the SDI Netherlands’s royalty 
liabilities and its royalty receipts), and treating that portion of the foreign-to-foreign royalty as U.S.-source. The court 
referred to this as the Service’s “‘flow-through’ position,” and approached this case using the analysis employed in Aiken 
Industries, Inc., 56 TC 925 (1971). This was highly detrimental to the Service’s case because of the clear factual distinctions 
between Aiken Industries (perhaps as good a conduit case from the Service’s perspective as ever has been) and SDI 
Netherlands. The court reasoned as follows: 
  
“Although Aiken Industries ... and Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner, [105 TC 341 (1995)], involved the 
conduit concept, we think they provide some guidance for our disposition of the instant case. We take this view because the 
flow-through characterization concept is, in a very real sense, the conduit concept albeit in a somewhat different garb, i.e., 
whether the U.S. source income is being received as such, because of the status of the paying entity in one case, and the 
status of the subject matter of the payment in the other....” (Emphasis added.) 
  
The court continued: “The facts of the matter are that the two license agreements had separate and distinct terms and that [the 
taxpayer] had an independent role as the licensee from SDI Bermuda and the licensor of the other entitles, including but not 
limited to SDI USA. The schedules of royalty payments provided for a spread, not unlike the spread involved in Northern 
Indiana, which compensated [the taxpayer] for its efforts. Like the finance subsidiary in Northern Indiana, [the taxpayer] 
engaged in licensing activities from which it realized substantial earnings. In fact, on a percentage basis, it earned between 5 
and 6 percent, compared to the 1 percent earned by that finance subsidiary in Northern Indiana. Under the circumstances 
herein, we think these arrangements should be accorded separate status with the result that, although the royalties paid by [the 
taxpayer] to SDI Bermuda were derived from the royalties received by [the taxpayer] from SDI USA, they were separate 
payments.” (Footnote omitted.) 
  
The court’s side observations. 
It is easy to agree with the court’s view that this was not a “conduit” case in which the “conduit entity” could rightly be 
ignored; this was not Aiken Industries. There is no evidence that the Service disagreed, either. But, in light of that, what the 
court really seems to have held is that royalties for the license of rights in a geographic area that includes the U.S. cannot to 
any extent be U.S.-source income if the payer is a foreign person. This is striking (to put it mildly) because Section 861(a)(4) 
sources royalty income by the place of use of the intangible, not the residence of the payer. 
  
The evidence that the Tax Court drew such a far-reaching conclusion lies in its analysis of Rev. Rul. 80-362 . That Ruling 
involved a foreign-to-foreign license of a U.S. patent, followed by a sublicense to a U.S. corporation. The Ruling states that 





because the royalties under the first license “are paid in consideration for the privilege of using a patent in the United States, 
they are treated as income from sources within the United States under section 861(a)(4) of the Code and are subject to 
United States income taxation under section 871(a)(1)(A).” 
  
The court could have distinguished the Ruling from the SDI Netherlands case factually, on the ground that the Ruling 
involved a foreign-to-foreign license of a right that had value only in the U.S. It might have held that a royalty generated by 
use throughout the world cannot be U.S.-source income even if a foreign-to-foreign royalty generated by use only in the U.S. 
clearly falls within the ambit of Section 861(a)(4). (Although if that were generally the case, queryhow one would apply, for 
example, a treaty provision like the U.S.-Canada treaty article on royalties, which provides for different tax rates on royalties 
for different rights that are typically bundled in a single license for a single royalty.) The court, however, drew no such 
distinction but simply ignored Rev. Rul. 80-362 because “[i]t fails to reflect any reasoning or supporting legal authority.” 
  
The true meaning of the court’s decision also is evident in its discussion of “cascading,” i.e., the multiple withholding of 
taxes on the same royalty *110 payment as it is transferred up the chain of licensors. It observed that, if one put aside the 
possibility of treaty relief, sourcing based on place of use, combined with the presence of foreign licensors and sublicensors, 
can cause U.S. gross-basis taxes to pile up, as royalties for the use of a single bundle of U.S. rights are paid up a chain of 
sublicensees to the ultimate licensor. This the court found impossible to accept: “We are not disposed to conclude, in the 
absence of any legislative expression on the subject, that Congress intended the statutory provisions to permit ‘cascading’ 
with the question of relief left to the mercy of [the IRS].” 
  
Potential Fall-Out 
One might have thought, before reading the SDI Netherlands  case, that it was clear that cascading was part of the law. Now, 
however, the Tax Court has given taxpayers a basis for claiming that it is not, “in the absence of any legislative expression on 
the subject.” If the law on the sourcing of royalties does not permit cascading liabilities, perhaps one can argue that the same 
is true of the law for sourcing other  items of income, the source of which is not a function of the residence of the payer or 
payee--for example, insurance premiums, services income, or rentals. On the reasoning of SDI Netherlands , for example, 
TAM 9621001 would be incorrect, and there would be no U.S. excise tax under Section 4371 on premiums paid by a foreign 
insurance company to reinsure a U.S. risk (or a group of risks including a U.S. risk) with a foreign reinsurer. Indeed, one 
might take the Tax Court’s rationale further and argue in other situations involving a potential double U.S. tax on the same 
income (e.g., Subpart F inclusions of income of a foreign corporation that are also subject to U.S. tax on the same income) 
that no double tax could have been intended by Congress. 
  
In addition, assuming that a Dutch BV qualifies (under the limitation of benefits provision of Article 26) for benefits under 
the 1992 U.S.-Netherlands treaty, Article 13(5)(d) of the treaty purports to allow U.S. withholding tax on royalty payments 
made by a Dutch BV for the use of intellectual property in the U.S., provided the BV also has received royalty payments 
from a U.S. person for use of the same intellectual property rights in the U.S. Would the application of Article 13(5)(d) have 
resulted in a different conclusion by the Tax Court? The court’s rationale was that the royalty payments by SDI Netherlands 
were not U.S.-source income. If this rationale were also followed under the 1992 treaty, the result may not be different since 
the 1992 treaty should not result in a greater tax obligation than would arise under U.S. domestic law. Absent a finding that a 
royalty payment by a BV is U.S.-source income, one may not even have to consider the U.S.-Netherlands treaty rules. 
Nevertheless, the Tax Court indicated in a footnote to the opinion that “changes in the U.S.-Netherlands treaty, applicable to 
years subsequent to the years before us, may provide a different framework for disposing of this issue.” This is rather mild 
language for a U.S. court to employ to suggest that the result may be different under the new treaty. If anything, the court’s 
footnote may be read to suggest that although the framework might be different, the result would likely be the same. Given 
the concern of the court that the Service’s application of the flow-through sourcing rule could result in a “cascading royalty” 
problem, it appears doubtful that the result would be any different under the 1992 treaty. 
  
Another issue is whether the application of the final conduit financing Regulations would compel a different result. In 
Section 7701(l), Congress directed the Service to implement Regulations on the problem of beneficial ownership in the 
context of back-to-back financing structures and the availability of treaty benefits. Does this Code section constitute a 
“legislative intention” to permit cascading? In a tantalizing hint, the Tax Court quotes with seeming approval an article 
critical of the cascading royalty potential under the final conduit financing Regulations.1 
  





In Section 7701(l), Congress did not expressly indicate the means by which Service was to implement this legislative 
mandate. The statutory language provides that “[t]he Secretary may prescribe regulations recharacterizing any multiple-party 
financing transaction as a transaction directly among 2 or more of such parties where the Secretary determines that such 
recharacterization is appropriate to prevent avoidance of any tax imposed by this title.” This language suggests that the IRS 
was given a mandate to implement Regulations that would allow it to disregard an intermediate entity in a financing 
arrangement (i.e., apply conduit principles). The language does not suggest that the Service was given the mandate to require 
withholding on royalties paid by non-U.S. persons or to otherwise alter U.S. domestic sourcing rules (i.e., apply flow-through 
sourcing rules). In this regard, it may be significant that the Conference Report on Section 7701(l) quotes with seeming 
approval several IRS Rulings dealing with conduit arrangements but does not refer to Rev. Rul. 80-362.2 
  
Further, rather than rely on conduit principles to recharacterize a royalty payment made by a U.S. person to an “intermediate 
entity,” the Service chose to implement the flow-through sourcing rationale to royalties. Example 10 of the conduit financing 
Regulations (Reg. 1.881-3(e)) is a clear statement of the Service’s approach to back-to-back royalty structures. The *111 
example involves an intermediate entity in a treaty country (FS) that receives a royalty payment from a U.S. person (DS) for 
the use of intellectual property in the U.S. The intermediate entity pays a similar royalty to a non-treaty-country resident (FP) 
for the use of that same property. The IRS reasons that FS is not a conduit entity because the rate of withholding tax required 
on the payment by FS to FP is the same as would have applied on a direct payment by DS to FP; therefore, there is no 
reduction of U.S. withholding tax. The example provides--apparently on the basis of Rev. Rul. 80-362 and not the conduit 
financing Regulations per se--that FS is required to withhold 30% tax on its payment to FP. Furthermore, the Service did not 
revoke Rev. Rul.80-362--unlike other back-to-back Rulings--after publication of the final conduit financing Regulations.3 It 
therefore appears that the Service believes that reliance on Rev. Rul. 80-362 was sufficient basis to attack structures such as 
those described in Example 10. 
  
Given the fact that Congress in section 7701(1) did not explicitly or implicitly authorize the IRS to employ flow-through 
sourcing rules to royalties but only to recharacterize financing transactions so as to ignore intermediate entities, it appears that 
the Service either has exceeded its authority in respect to the approach taken to royalties or has chosen the wrong approach 
(flow-through sourcing rather than conduit treatment). It further appears that the court’s rationale in SDI Netherlands  could 
be applied to payments and structures in place after the effective dates of the new U.S.-Netherlands treaty and the conduit 
financing Regulations. 
  
Alternatively, even though the IRS apparently drafted the conduit Regulations under the assumption that Rev. Rul.80-362 
represented a correct interpretation of U.S. sourcing rules, if the Ruling must be abandoned the Service may argue that it can 
apply the strict conduit approach to back-to-back royalties. Example 10 is predicated on the assumption that no U.S. 
withholding tax is due on the payment from DS to FS because the payment from FS to FP is subject to U.S. withholding tax. 
If this assumption is incorrect, the Service could argue that the payment from DS to FP (via FS) is subject to U.S. 
withholding tax under the conduit theory rather than the sourcing theory. Whether the IRS could do this without revising the 
conduit Regulations seems questionable, however. As a general matter, there should be some point at which the Service is 
required to live with the rule it has explicitly set forth in Regulations. 
  
Planning Opportunity 
As a result of SDI Netherlands , source of income issues may become less important with respect to royalties. In addition, 
acquisitions by foreign acquirors may be easier to accomplish. It now may be possible, for example, to form an entity in a 
jurisdiction that has a treaty with the U.S. under which withholding would not be required. This entity would be used to hold 
intangible assets, and could become a central repository for the royalties. This would eliminate a secondary U.S. withholding 
tax when royalties were onpaid to another foreign entity that would not be covered by a U.S. treaty. 
  
In an asset acquisition, separating the intangibles from the manufacturing assets while eliminating concerns about secondary 
withholding taxes can permit a foreign acquiror to effectively strip out earnings from a domestic acquired entity. It is 
necessary, however, that the royalty rates meet the requirements of Section 482. Furthermore, any limitation of benefits 
provision of the treaty with the country in which the entity is formed will have to be complied with. 
  
Conclusion 





It is one thing to say that a royalty paid for a bundle of rights, not all of which are subject to the same U.S. tax treatment, 
cannot be broken down into pieces subject to differing U.S. gross-basis tax consequences, or cannot be broken down under 
the facts of a particular case. Such a rationale could have served as the basis for the SDI Netherlands  opinion but apparently 
did not. Instead, the Tax Court seems to have arrived at the more sweeping position that foreign-to-foreign payments for the 
use of U.S. intangible property cannot be U.S.-source income under any circumstances. It would not be surprising if, as in 
Brown Group Inc., 77 F.3d 217, 77 AFTR2d 96-510 (CA-8, 1995), the IRS fights vigorously to have this case withdrawn, 
reheard, appealed, or whatever else it takes to expunge it from the books. It also would not be surprising if, as in Brown 
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See H. Rep’t No. 103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 186, fns. 3-5 (Statement of the Managers, 8/4/93), citing Rev. Ruls. 84-152, 




See Rev. Rul. 95-56, 1995-2 CB 322, obsoleting Rev. Ruls. 84-152 and 87-89 (Situations 1 and 2), supranote 2, along with Rev. 
Ruls. 84-153, 1984-2 CB 383, and 85-163, 1985-2 CB 349. 
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